

Prophets and profits in Indonesia's social forestry partnership schemes: Introducing a sequential power analysis

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Prophets and profits in Indonesia's social forestry partnership schemes: Introducing a sequential power analysis



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ABSTRACT

Studies on power dynamics have helped to develop a better understanding of the role of actors and interests influencing community forestry initiatives. This article introduces a sequential power analysis as a framework for expanding research on power dynamics to better understand the various stages that shape benefit sharing outcomes in community forestry. The research is based on the increasingly popular “partnership” scheme in Indonesia, but the framework is introduced as a method for potential application in other community forestry contexts. The framework is based on three parts. It first historicizes the actors in what we term the “power background.” Thereafter we examine the arrival of a partnership scheme described as “power delivery”. Third, we highlight a process of “power adjustment,” which serves to explain the way actors achieve benefit sharing outcomes. Our research draws from a diverse set of partnership schemes from four sites across five different comparative variables. We find that the framing of power delivery allows us to identify the key actors that serve as the messengers of partnership schemes (the prophets) promoting the terms of project implementation. In the latter stages however, power adjustment determines the outcomes, which are contingent upon benefit-sharing arrangements (profits). Not only does our sequential power analysis help to enrich studies of power dynamics in community forestry, we also show that the current implementation of the partnership scheme in Indonesia is unlikely to result in more equitable outcomes, but rather serves to strengthen the position of existing powerful actors.

1. Introduction

In the wake of decades of rapid rates of deforestation and land conflict, the Indonesian government has shifted to more inclusive development policies in the form of agrarian reform and social forestry (Fisher et al., 2019). Recent analysis of such programs, particularly social forestry programs, have shown that they have fallen well short of their intended promises (Sahide et al., 2018; Fisher et al., 2018; Bong et al., 2019; Moeliono et al., 2017). More generally, conclusions from this research state that social forestry initiatives suffer from a broad set of constraints. They are overgeneralized across diverse geographic contexts, rigidly confined to 35-year time blocks, centralized in their

administration, overly technocratic and procedural, thus resulting in messy unintended outcomes. These conclusions, however, are focused overwhelmingly on two specific types of initiatives, namely community forestry and indigenous rights recognition. There is one social forestry approach however, that is gaining increasing popularity of late, which is called the ‘partnership’ scheme. The partnership scheme has become attractive because it offers a different and more flexible mechanism. Partnerships provide proponents the space to determine their own rules, especially around the critical aspects of management duration (unlimited time scale), opens up the possibility to restructure benefit-sharing arrangements, and allows for independent agreements on dispute resolution and sanctions.

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There are two unique elements of the partnership scheme. First, from a substantive standpoint, the partnership scheme provides space for a diversity of arrangements, and as noted above, the actors get to decide many of the governance parameters. Secondly, partnership schemes also allow for implementation in a diversity of contexts. Programs can take place on state and non-state forest locations, and under regulatory or market provisions. As a result of this diversity, our analysis focuses on the role of actors and the power they exert on a given process (Maryudi and Sahide, 2017). In this paper, we began by seeking to identify an appropriate heuristic for understanding the emerging partnership dynamic in Indonesia. Analysis on community forestry has effectively applied framework based on research of “power dynamics,” which directly examine each case. However, in explaining the partnership scheme, we found that we needed an extra step in determining the power background of the key actors. The objectives of the research is therefore twofold. The first is to understand to what extent the partnership scheme presents opportunity for more equitable benefit sharing outcomes. Meanwhile, a second corresponding objective of this paper is to identify the extent to which adding stages to a heuristic of power dynamics could provide more nuance for others studying community forestry elsewhere.

Our initial challenge to examining the partnership scheme arose due to the many variations and contexts of implementation. We thus required a more flexible but rigorous analytical framework. For example, how would we compare partnership schemes that are on the one hand driven by the market, while others are shaped by regulatory initiatives, and others still are driven by a historical mandate? In our cases we will show examples of each, and we will also show how the framework we develop adequately compares across seemingly different cases. Our overall basis for designing the frameworks comes from a rich tradition of research from behavioral studies (Dahl, 1957; Weber, 2000; Krott et al., 2014) merged with historical framings to natural resource management (Brosius et al., 1998, 2005). The behavioral studies highlight the ways that formal goals and informal interests come together to shape particular programming goals (Sahide and Giessen, 2015; Sahide et al., 2015; Sahide et al., 2016; Giessen and Sahide, 2017; Fatem et al., 2018). In particular, Krott et al. (2014) actor-centered power, provides a convenient menu in three parts that researchers have often applied as a way to understand actor interests. This heuristic is often described as the “power dynamics” framework. Power dynamics analysis is characterized by actor-centered power characterizations that highlight the subcomponents of power elements, their enactment, and corresponding outcomes.

However, we provide a new dimension to the actor-centered power approaches by situating power temporally and historically. We thus describe our proposed analytical framework as a sequential power analysis (SPA), which elucidates three pillars, power background, power delivery, and power adjustment. The details of the SPA are further articulated and justified in the methods section (see MethodsX section).

Our paper proceeds as follows. In section two, we first provide a broad description and history of the partnership scheme. In section three, we present the methods of our research, detailing the SPA framework and describing the selection of sites from a range of comparative possibilities. In section four, we examine the four different partnership schemes that underpin the empirical analysis of this paper, each examined under the three-part SPA framework. We conclude in section five, pointing out the glaring similarities across the power delivery and adjustment phases from each case, highlighting the way that *profits* and *profits* structure the outcomes at these different stages.

2. General overview of forest partnership policies in Indonesia

Indonesia functions on a dual fragmented land administration model. There is national forest land managed by the state, and there are titled forests that consist of private and indigenous lands, which are located outside of national forests (Sahide and Giessen, 2015). Social forestry schemes are applied in national forests, and there are other specific schemes for supporting titled forests (such as people's forests and

indigenous forests). Partnership schemes however, are unique because they can be legally applied to both national or titled forests. Partnership schemes in national forests can collaborate directly between land managers like Forest Management Units (FMU)¹ or concessionaires in their engagement with forest farmer groups. In titled forests, the arrangements are directed by market or industrial companies and can be supported by various forestry agencies (e.g. BPDAS as a water resource management body of the forestry ministry). Partnership schemes in titled forests however, have a much smaller supervision role by state actors, and as we show in the cases below, is mostly driven by the market and emerge as a result of direct negotiations with farmers or middlemen.

Although partnership schemes are an emerging policy in Indonesia, they have been around for a long time. The reason for their current emergence is directly related to the new mandate of the KPH to oversee land management. KPHs have been established as the forest land management authority with a dual and often contradictory mandate. On the one hand KPHs are required to conduct cost recovery operations, and to generate new profits. On the other hand, KPHs are also tasked with addressing tenurial conflict and empowering local communities. Managing such conflicts require much time, leadership, and capacity building, which runs counter to the profit oriented motive. These conditions led KPHs to begin promoting the partnership scheme because the scheme allows them to maintain authority, work with local communities, and provides the opportunity to pursue revenue-generating ventures.

Fig. 1 describes the long history and evolution of forestry partnership schemes in Indonesia. The notion of partnership schemes goes back as far as the Dutch colonial forest management era of the mid 19th century (Peluso, 1992). At that time large teak plantations were established in Java and managed under the oversight of the state forestry corporation (SFC), a state-owned enterprise. They began to establish partnership schemes to facilitate better relations between foremen (*mandor*) and plantation laborers (*buruh*). In 1972 the SFC applied a new approach, rather than policing plantation boundaries, they began to work with local actors by providing subsidies for agricultural inputs and supporting the construction of clean water facilities. In the 1980s, SFC introduced the Village Community Development programs and worked with communities to establish the first forest farmer groups to cultivate agroforestry groves, and subsequently introduced the terminology of social forestry. In the 1990s, the SFC opened up the opportunity for more explicit working relationships with local governments, developing programs such as Integrated Development with Village Forest Communities (PMDHT), Forest Village Communities Empowerment programs (PMDH), and others. In 2001, empowering communities was incorporated as a programmatic focus by the SFC, entitled the Community-based Collaborative Forest Management program (PHBM - *pengelolaan hutan bersama masyarakat*) (Perum Perhutani, 2018). The implementation of PHBM was widely expected by communities to bring more equitable access to forest resources in Java (Maryudi et al., 2016). The implementation assessments however, highlighted that PHBM did not provide adequate returns to communities (as we will also show in case 1 of this paper). As a result, the forestry ministry acted by issuing a new regulation in 2017 to re-establish the terms of partnerships (which is called 'IPHPS'). They required SFC to restructure revenues to 80/20% returns favoring communities for the greater share over the SFC. The new regulations also mandated an extension of the partnership to 35 years.

The example of this partnership regulation in Java and the SFC also created precedence for implementation across Indonesia. It was thus formally developed as a social forestry scheme in national forests under ministerial regulation P.39/2013, and amended in ministerial regulation P.23/2016. The regulation mandated the FMU (or other granted license holder) to build an equal partnership scheme that is based on the agreement drafted among parties. Outside of national forests in

¹ In Java, these schemes are not by FMUs but rather with Perhutani or the State Forestry Corporation (SFC).




Fig. 1. The forest partnership policy evolution in Indonesia.

Table 1
Typology of partnership scheme selection.

Scheme	Geography		Forests status		Proponent actor		Driving factors		Implementation after agreement		
	Java	Outside Java	State forest	Private land/ forest	Internal actor	External actor	Regulatory	Market driven	Full	Partly	Failed
SFC Case	V		V		V		V		V		
FMU Awota		V	V		V		V				V
Private forests facilitated by Government		V		V		V	V			V	
Private forests guided by the market		V		V		V		V	V		

titled lands, there are more independent opportunities to develop a partnership scheme. In its current manifestations, the partnership schemes continue to increase in popularity, particularly due to the flexibility it affords the KPH. It is this phenomenon that we seek to examine, and to test whether the applications of the partnership schemes afford new opportunities to identify more equitable outcomes in managing forests.

3. Methodological approach: sequential power analysis (SPA) framework

Insert MethodsX - The SPA method is attached in this article as MethodsX.

4. Method

We identify four case studies with different contexts of partnership schemes. We wanted to ensure that the cases were representative across a particular set of key variables (Laraswati et al., 2020). Each of the variable categories are listed in Table 1 and Fig. 2. In particular, we selected five variable categories to include for comparison across the partnership schemes. This included: i) geography (within and beyond Java); ii) sites that were located in national forests and titled lands; iii) different proponents that facilitated the initiative (whether they emerged internally or were brought in by external actors); iv) whether the partnership schemes were driven by a regulatory impetus or initiated by market forces; and, v) whether the agreement failed or was either partially or fully implemented.

We selected four cases to examine these comparative dimensions. The first case is part of a longstanding partnership scheme implemented by the SFC in Java, with origins as far back as the Dutch colonial period. The second case relates to a partnership between an FMU and local community (the FMU Awota partnership scheme). The third case study observes the state as facilitator of a partnership scheme between a timber corporation and a forest farmer group. Finally, the fourth case involves a market-driven partnership between local middlemen and a timber corporation in titled forests.

4.1. Data collection for each of the four case studies

Data for case studies 1 and 2 are based on participant observation as action research,² whereby some of the authors were involved as active facilitators in the policy design process for developing the partnership scheme. In Case 3, some of the authors followed the dynamics unfolding at the site closely (Maryudi and Fisher, 2020). Analysis in this paper therefore emerged from following these changes overtime, as well as a site visit after the partnership agreement had been signed to examine the immediate outcomes. In Case 4, authors were not directly involved in the case but aggregated field research had been conducted at the site. In particular, analysis in this case draws from field level document research (Rahayu et al., 2019) and socio-economic data analysis (Arpandi, 2012; Zahra, 2018) across the various beneficiaries among actors.

² see Zuber-Skerritt, 2003 on guidance about the overall action research approach that we pursued




Fig. 2. Map of case study locations.

5. Results

5.1. The SFC - LMDH partnerships: defining a 75/25% revenue sharing agreement

5.1.1. Power background: imbalanced and centralized control over forest resources

SFC was established as a state-owned enterprise that only exists on Java. As such an enterprise, its central mandate is to generate income and improve the overall economy for the national development agenda in the forest sector. The SFC therefore functions as a semi-autonomous state institution responsible for its own administration and management (Maryudi et al., 2012). Until today, the SFC continues to apply this colonial administration model by controlling ownership over all the national forests (both production and protection) that it has a mandate to manage. Government Regulation No. 72/2010 further extends the SFC mandate to directly oversee land management. The regulation also provides overall guidance on the types of management, guidelines for production, and possibilities for finding particular buyers. It also provides guidance on its mandate to protect forests. The SFC thus views its role in managing forest land in a very rigid approach, securing land and exercising control over forest resources in particular ways, most notably in their ability to employ and mobilize armed forest rangers (Peluso, 1992). SFC's approach therefore, has long been achieved by exerting control over forest resources by actively excluding local people from accessing those resources (Maryudi et al., 2016). It is these weighted imbalances that structure the contextual power background in the partnership scheme we examine in the SFC Java case, whereby the SFC upholds a state mandate to perform dominant control over forest resources by imposing their power and overlooking any possible claims made by local communities.

5.1.2. Power delivery: using general terms in creating agreements

Due to the dominant state control over forest resources described in the power background above, local communities have sought to gain access in various ways, namely through timber theft, encroachment, and in extreme cases making a statement by deliberately burning forests to

showcase the illegitimate enclosures by SFC (Peluso, 2011). By the late 20th century, the state reshaped under a governing system of democratic decentralization, in which communities had new means for demanding access to state forest land (Maryudi et al., 2012). Community-based approaches, and in particular, the movement towards the social forestry paradigm in Indonesia has emerged as a panacea to facilitate implementation of an ideal decentralized of forest resources management (Tacconi, 2007). In the section detailing the historical developments of the partnership scheme above, we described some of the precursors that evolved into the PHBM scheme, and eventually repurposed as the partnership scheme. To gain access to the scheme communities, the SFC mandated that local villages create registered farmer organizations. These were called LMDH (*Lembaga Masyarakat Desa Hutan*, or Village Forest Community Groups). If established according to SFC rules, the LMDH can gain 25% of the revenue from timber sales. The partnership agreement in these cases are defined according to the proportion of inputs between parties. Community members initially responded very positively to these terms. However, as we will show in the ways that power is adjusted in these partnership schemes, the terms are also unilaterally defined and interpreted by the SFC.

5.1.3. Power adjustment: manipulating agreements by technocratic method

Although the community was initially supportive of the 25% breakdown, Affianto et al. (2005) highlight that there was no basis for deciding that the share of revenues for the community should amount to 25%, and there was no input-output analysis deciding this figure. The LMDHs willingly accepted the benefit sharing arrangement, in large part because it was the first time that the SFC provided material economic incentives to local communities. LMDHs thus anticipated that large sums of money would begin flowing into local communities. For this reason, they accepted the 25% revenue sharing rules at face value, also assuming that the full portion of the returns would be delivered to them without further deductions. They were unaware however, that the shares defined by SFC were based on low forest potential evaluations, and incorporated past considerations of revenue losses, such as those related to illegal logging by communities. LMDHs were also uninformed about how much

timber were harvested from forests, nor how forest harvest prices were defined. In fact, SFC decided that the proportion would be based on floor prices of timber harvested, rather than more accurate market prices, meaning that the actual portion designated for local communities were much lower. In addition, SFC threatened to cancel or deduct the promised financial shares to the LMDH in the event of any reduction of forest potentials (such as those related to illegal logging). The most potent tool for interpreting these agreements were through the use of formal language that were poorly understood by LMDH committees. Using the technical language of bureaucracy and legal interpretation to redefine the terms, the shares to the LMDH applied a coefficient of the harvest rotation for each compartment, that was further divided by the year of that particular agreement. Thereafter, the value of each share was further subtracted by harvest and marketing costs, information which was not made available for the LMDH (Fig. 3).

5.2. Forest partnerships in FMU Awota, 1:1:1

5.2.1. Power background: new management structures interact with informal local elites in long ungoverned state forests

As an institution, FMUs are a longstanding and powerful authority of land management in Java. As described in Case 1 above, the SFC functions as an FMU that tightly manages land management practices in Java's national forests. In the outer islands³ however, although there is no SFC, past forest management practices also operated under close supervision and scrutiny from a centrally controlled bureaucracy. Across Indonesia rural communities were fearful of occupying lands designated under national forest jurisdictions, particularly among the highly guarded strategic flatlands designated as production forests. These conditions altered distinctly in the wake of the dismantling of centralized state management in 1998, marking the end of the Soeharto era and ushering in democratic decentralization reforms. As a result of this diminished and newly contested mandate of centralized authority, communities across Indonesia sensed a power vacuum. This began a period of widespread encroachment on state forest lands, no longer fearing the same retribution of the past.

In 2010, the central governing authorities at the forestry ministry sought to reclaim and consolidate control by instituting a uniform management structure in the form of FMUs (Kementerian Kehutanan, 2014). The FMU structure is taken from the Javanese example of the SFC. Managed at a regional level (see Tajuddin et al., 2019; Tajuddin et al., 2018; Sahide et al., 2016), the FMU model was applied across Indonesia through a system of incentives and disincentives, promising resources from state coffers, but also threatening to take them away. In many instances, like the cases we describe herein, as the FMUs sought to establish authority on state forest lands outside of Java, they confronted existing actors already occupying lands. These powerful local actors, often with local official governing positions, have vested interests on the continued control of these lands.

This broader context of power background thus brings us to the case of the FMU in Awota, overseen by the Wajo regional government. The FMU initially began to re-establish their management and planning responsibilities. While doing so, they experienced conditions whereby local elite controlled particular areas of national forest lands. In the partnership scheme facilitated by the Awota FMU, three individuals had long ago staked out plots in national forest land and claimed them as their own. They used their past leadership positions in local village government to legitimate claims, which they further adjust through positions holding local cultural leadership status, and subsequently mobilized labor to cultivate crops on these lands.

For various reasons, the Awota FMU gained national attention and support, and was selected among a group of FMUs across Indonesia to act as a model for other regions to follow. The Awota FMU thus turned to Universitas Hasanuddin (UNHAS) for expertise and support in

planning initiatives. Aware of the conditions of land occupation by local elite, the Awota FMU sought to attempt to develop the partnership scheme for implementation. Wajo had in the past been a region famous for its silk production (Nuraeni, 2017; Pratama et al., 2019), and the development of this industry in national forest lands provided for a strategic mutual basis for collaboration and possibility amidst existing land management realities and institutional pressure.

5.2.2. Power delivery: policy directives and facilitating partnerships

The partnership scheme at the Awota FMU began in the context of two policy demands. The first was part of the broader context of national policy developments described in the policy background above, namely an FMU interested in showcasing themselves as a model FMU and the partnership scheme providing a strategic mechanism for bridging across multiple interests. On the other hand, local land politics and the interests to invigorate the silk industry strategically positioned the partnership scheme as a basis for collaboration. Therefore, these actors came together to oversee a KPH program to implement a partnership scheme that could incorporate the redevelopment of the silk industry. In order to implement the most accountable systems, the FMU contracted UNHAS to facilitate policy interpretation and field applications. UNHAS also had a budget for community empowerment programs that they were eager to disburse and implement as part of a policy initiative that could also address equity concerns among the community. Therefore, all the information of the partnership scheme was provided in great detail, including for the elites and through a series of FGDs and a workshop to develop broader understanding and decide on the terms of agreement (see Fig. 4 for the agreement letter specimen)

5.2.3. Power adjustment: agreeing on revenue sharing arrangements

In this partnership scheme, the FMU provided support for the 25 ha in the "empowerment blocks." Support was provided for the cultivation of mulberry plants, which provide a first step in providing a habitat for silkworms. The FMU was therefore eager to readjust their power by providing support for mulberry plantings to local communities that provided opportunities for project disbursement framed as an empowerment project. The aims of project implementation also sought to adjust conditions as the local authority on these national forest lands. The agreements created with local farmer groups provided a basis for re-establishing authority.

However, although agreements were reached with local farmer groups on mulberry plantings and silkworm cultivation, the three local elites did not necessarily follow along these proceedings. Specifically, they purposefully avoided the initial proceedings to develop processes for coming to an agreement. These three key elite actors with vested claims on the lands in question did not attend any of the program implementation activities to designate the "empowerment blocks." They were invited but never attended the FGDs, which included participatory mapping ending in joint-agreements on the partnership rules with farmer groups. After the discussions were complete, they stated that they did not attend meetings because they were not part of the farmer groups. But upon further inquiry, it became clear that their absence was a reflection of their lack of support on the overall processes of redesignating lands for uses other than the ones that they had already planned as landowners of these sites.

The initial agreement stated that the mulberry (100%) revenues would go to the farmer groups. However, the more important source of revenue locally related to timber harvests. This was more contentious, and in the end led to a revenue sharing compromise agreement across three stakeholder blocks. The three elite members claimed that they planted trees there with an expectation that they would receive eventual benefits from their investments. They also stated that such initiatives also indicated a claim of land ownership. After several FGDs, there was still no agreement because of the three elites. In the end, the FMU, farmer groups and the three local elites came to an agreement of a three-part equal revenue sharing agreement (1:1:1).

During negotiations, the Awota FMU promised incentives for Jabon seedling to plant in the core 25 ha designated under the empowerment

³ Land management systems outside of Java are often generalized under the term "outer islands"




Fig. 3. SFC Partnership agreement in Kabupaten Ngawi 2006.

block of the partnership scheme. The duration of the proposed partnership scheme included two cycles of management for Jabon timber, over 15 years, which includes 14 years to maturity as well as additional time for preparation and evaluation. For the first time, one of the community members from the negotiation forum proposed only one business cycle for Jabon, 7 or 8 years, but after discussing with other community members and listening to the consideration of the KPH chief, the proposed cycle was twice the Jabon business. The longer duration increased the interest of the farmer group to participate in the partnership.

5.3. Partnership in private forests of Jeneponto (70% farmers: 30% corporate)

5.3.1. Power background: a foundation for partnership between the Piaeng farmer group and BPDAS

The Piaeng farmer group in Beroanging village, Jeneponto district have private land title and manage forest plantation groves on these

lands. This is a unique case, because unlike many other forest lands in Indonesia that have overlapping claims, the land ownership arrangements are clear in that the farmer groups have formal title/certificate to these lands. They are able to select what they plant. These lands are difficult to access however, due to the distance from settlement areas of the village, and have thus been utilized as secondary lands. Most of the livelihoods of the Piaeng farmer group focus on their rice fields and other commodity crops. Timber crops have grown over time in these secondary locations and are used during times of personal need. However, there has not been a more concerted effort to manage these lands for a variety of reasons. First, the transportation costs to get the timber to market is prohibitive. Second, there has been a procedural disincentive for harvesting trees because of national policies to address deforestation that make logging more restrictive. Therefore, forest rangers very quickly crack down on any indications of timber harvesting in South Sulawesi. Third, as part of these policy-driven effects, mandatory timber certification has become more difficult, requiring

**PERJANJIAN KERJASAMA
ANTARA
KEPALA KESATUAN PENGELOLAAN HUTAN PRODUKSI (KPHP) MODEL AWOTA
DENGAN
KELOMPOK TANI SIPAKATAU**

Pada hari ini Minggu, tanggal 23 bulan Oktober tahun 2016 bertempat di Kantor Desa Minanga Tellue, Kabupaten Wajo, Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan, kami yang bertanda tangan di bawah ini:

Nama : Rusmiati, S.Hut.
Alamat : BTN Bulupabbulu Blok A9/14 Sengkang Kabupaten Wajo
Jabatan : Kepala KPHP Model Awota

Dalam hal ini bertindak atas nama KPHP Model Awota yang beralamat di:
Kota Sengkang : Jalan Veteran No. 33 Sengkang Kabupaten Wajo
Kabupaten : Wajo

Selanjutnya disebut sebagai **PIHAK PERTAMA**

Nama : Muh. Asmidin
Alamat : Dusun Tingaraposi, Desa Minangatellue, Kabupaten Wajo
Pekerjaan/Jabatan : Petani/Ketua Kelompok Tani Hutan Sipakatau

Selanjutnya bertindak atas nama **PIHAK KEDUA**

PIHAK PERTAMA dan PIHAK KEDUA telah bermusyawarah dan sepakat untuk melakukan kerjasama kemitraan dengan ketentuan-ketentuan sebagaimana tercantum dalam Naskah Perjanjian Kemitraan sebagaimana tercantum dalam lampiran yang merupakan bagian tidak terpisahkan dari Perjanjian Kerjasama ini. Demikian Surat Perjanjian Kerjasama ini dibuat dan disepakati kedua belah pihak, dan ditandatangani bersama dengan materai yang cukup.



Fig. 4. Agreement between Awota FMU and the forest farmer group, witnessed by Head of Village and District Forest Agency.

increased costs to obtain a permit and thus making it more challenging for smallholders to harvest (Widyaningsih and Diniyati, 2010; Obidzinski and Dermawan, 2010).

One central agency of the Forestry Ministry, the Jeneberang Walanae Watershed Management Agency (BPDAS) has for a long time implemented programs with the Piaeng farmer group. For example, in the past BPDAS have partnered with the Piaeng farmer group to successfully showcase forest rehabilitation projects, disbursement of seedlings for community forestry, and others. In this way the farmer group and BPDAS have established trust and as such provided the foundation for initiating the partnership scheme discussed in the power delivery section below.

5.3.2. Power delivery: locating a timber plantation site and connecting the market in a partnership scheme

As the partnership scheme became available as a potential program, the BPDAS in South Sulawesi saw a strategic opportunity to apply the scheme as part of their existing relationship with the Piaeng farmer group. The flexibility of the partnership scheme to work on private lands located outside of national forest areas also made the Piaeng site an attractive one to pursue. These private lands present the opportunity to more intensively manage them in more productive ways and BPDAS viewed this as a potential opportunity to identify areas of revenue generation by further cultivating timber plantations in a region with increasing demand. BPDAS also strategically selected the site in an

upstream area, describing this partnership not only for timber production purposes but also with the intent of rehabilitating upper watershed areas. BPDAS further helped to facilitate a connection between the Piaeng farmer group with a buyer, in this case PT Panfly.

PT Panfly sources wood in South Sulawesi for their plywood business. The plywood industry has long been one of the more lucrative industries in the Indonesian forestry sector, and although global demand is increasing, production shortages mean that suppliers are unable to meet lucrative market demands. PT Panfly were also looking to expand their operations into the southern portions of South Sulawesi, complete with factory development plans in the nearby district of Bulukumba. The different parties and mechanisms began to align strategically between BPDAS, the Piaeng farmer group, and PT Panfly. The Piaeng group would source potential raw materials for plywood and PT Panfly's nearby factory would be able to receive the supply. Working arrangements between the parties were initiated through planting activities by the Piaeng farmer groups that began in 2010.

BPDAS acted as the key facilitator in supporting the agreement between the PT Panfly and the Piaeng farmer group. They began to work together to develop a business model to fulfill the elements of the partnership scheme, namely to manage an industrial plantation to cultivate what is popularly known as *jati putih* (literally "white teak," a fast-growing timber crop – *Gmelina arborea roxb*). The arrangement included full details of the working partnership, such as land management considerations, seedling disbursement, land maintenance, pest management, harvesting, all the way to the product marketing stages. The location also included a relatively large area, an uninterrupted landscape of 500 ha.

All 500 ha of the land belonged to the Piaeng farmer group, simplifying what can be complex land tenurial considerations. The agreement created a scenario that divided between the core zone of 50 ha supported by BPDAS. The remaining areas would be supported by PT Panfly. In the 50 ha core zone, BPDAS fulfilled their commitment to support all stages of land management until the third year (in the planting year and during two additional years of land maintenance). The remaining 450 ha meanwhile, would receive similar support from PT Panfly over the same duration. PT Panfly also agreed to support nursery development, by supplying seedlings for the plantation, and supporting the crucial role of securing the harvest permit. The agreement noted the duration for the partnership over a seven year period from 2010 to 2017. The forest farmers therefore only need to invest their labor. In the agreement, PT Panfly would thereafter recoup 30% of the timber costs, while providing payments of 70% of timber sales based on the market price for cost unit to the farmer groups. This arrangement was viewed by all parties to be a fairly negotiated process, particularly when compared with common industrial timber plantations like the SFC case described above, which pays a much smaller percentage to farmer groups, nor do they account for the calculations transparently.⁴

The signed agreement was celebrated as a precedent setting achievement and an exemplary negotiation in the region. For that reason, the signing ceremony between the Piaeng farmer group and PT Panfly was also attended and witnessed by the Bupati (head of district) and the Governor. BPDAS was eager to highlight this type of agreement as a possible model for replicating the partnership scheme, while playing a role in potentially reinvigorating the plywood industry in the region.

5.3.3. Power adjustment: a model that never got beyond initial program disbursement

Problems had already become evident during the highly politicized signing ceremony. Although the Piaeng group was invited to attend by

⁴ For context, Arpandi (2012) conducted a study to calculate the breakdown of equitable partnerships after incorporating labor and land rent input considerations. He found that the benefit sharing composition should reflect a 15.7% income for the company, while the farmers should receive 84.3% benefits.

the governor's office, the head of the farmer group thereafter stated that they never received a copy of the signed agreement. BPDAS followed up with their commitments by fulfilling their role in supporting seedling planting and maintenance for the first three years. However, as the planting stages shifted into the maintenance phases, project managers had begun to lose interest and were not as invested in seeing implementation. More importantly, PT Panfly did not follow up with their part of the agreement. The farmer groups noted that they believed the problems were with the overall supply chain. Plans to develop the processing plant in Bulukumba did not go through as planned, and thus, PT Panfly's interests in supporting land management with the Piaeng farmer group also waned.

5.4. Partnerships in titled forests of Pangkep and Bone districts (65% farmers: 35% middlemen)

5.4.1. Power background: a company, middlemen, and timber farmers

The case of Pangkep and Bone differs slightly from the previous case in one crucial way. While the Piaeng group in Jenepono was supported and initiated by a government entity, the case from Pangkep and Bone dealt purely with market forces, involving farmers growing timber products on private land, and a single company (PT. Tombongi Permata Raya). This system of timber production was facilitated by middlemen that connected farmers to the company. We highlight this case between the farmers and the company through two sets of relationships, what we describe as middleman A (since 2003) in the Pangkep location and middleman B at the Bone site (since 2011). Although we describe this case as a pure transaction between a private enterprise that works with middlemen who source timber directly from farmers, the legitimating role of the forestry agency does play a limited role, which we will also touch on briefly in the power delivery section.

5.4.2. Power delivery: bilateral agreements driven by the market, legitimated by the local forestry agency

PT. Tombongi Permata Raya partnered with both middlemen (A and B) as their suppliers for logs. The partnership arrangement (Fig. 5) was developed by the company as a buyers contract. In other words, the company could purchase directly from the middlemen at the market price at the time of purchase, which is often very much decided by information from the company. The mechanism is supported by the company, who provides an initial loan of IDR10 million⁵ as initial investment capital, which the middlemen can use and repay after each timber harvest purchase from the farmers. The duration of the commitment between the company and the middleman is on an annual basis and renewed each year in the month of January. The agreement shown in Fig. 1 is legitimized through a formal agreement with the letterhead of the provincial forestry agency. The agency was also a witness during the signing of the agreement. The formal agreement has the effect of a legitimate transaction taking place in private forests.

The transaction mechanisms are as follows. First the local middleman obtains timber negotiated per standing tree with the farmers. The middleman thereafter fulfills their administrative requirements for obtaining the rights to those stands. This includes the permits for harvest and transportation. The farmer thereafter decides the price of each stand. Although it is the case that formally the farmers hold the authority to set the price, the middlemen, with more information on the markets have greater influence in the purchasing negotiations.

5.4.3. Power adjustment: benefits favoring the middleman

We are limited in the scope of the data to analyze overall power adjustment because we could not obtain figures from the company. However, it is a fair assumption that the continued engagement of the

⁵ Approximately US\$1100–1200 for 2003/2011 exchange rate, which was approximately IDR 8500 - IDR 9100 / per US\$ 1.00.




Fig. 5. Letter of agreement between local middleman and PT Tombongi Permata Raya.

company means that they have yielded more than adequate benefits. Data is available however, on the benefit shares between the farmer and the middleman (Zahra, 2018). She provided a detailed breakdown of revenues by comparing values between timber farmers and middlemen as follows:

Middleman income

- Total costs: IDR 1,940,037 / m³
- Total income (before factoring in costs): IDR 3,146,309 / m³
- Total income: IDR 1,206,271 / m³

Farmer income

- Total costs: the production costs for a single harvest rotation (ten years)
- Total income from sale: IDR 794,045 / m³

In other words, the total revenue differences between the middleman and the farmer can be divided between the overall income from sale before costs, or after costs, depending on the perspective of income. Although middlemen carry the burden of taking care of administration and permits, the hidden costs from the farmers are also significant,

including the labor, opportunity cost (from planting something else), production costs, harvest costs, and the land tax (or rents in some cases). Before these costs, the income ratios of revenues are quite stark (794,045 / 3,145,309). This means that there is a 75:25 differentiation between the middleman and local farmer. But after the administration costs are incorporated, farmers only get about 2/3rds of the income compared to the middleman. Depending on the perspective, the distribution of revenues highlights skewed benefit ratios in favor of the middleman. These values also do not take into account the long term wait, the initial investment, the cultivation risk, and the overall labor that falls to the burden of the farmer.

6. Discussion

In this paper, we compared an increasingly popular set of social forestry sites called the partnership scheme. We thus selected from a variety of different sites implementing the partnership scheme, providing a range of comparative analysis. As we showed in Table 1 and Fig. 2, the empirical material comes from sites on state vs private land, in Java vs outside of outer islands, internal vs external actors, regulatory vs market, and whether the agreement was implemented or not.

The SPA framework helped us to situate power not only as part of its

contemporary manifestations, but also as part of their historical context. The three elements of the SPA framework include power background, power delivery, and power adjustment. Power background provided the crucial context, which helped us to examine power in unique ways at each of the sites and identify the existing power sharing arrangements prior to the initiation of the partnership scheme. Thereafter, as we began to examine power delivery across the sites, we identified their similarities. In the power delivery phase, we also focused on the key actors, the messengers that were able to propose a particular initiative. We thus refer to them as the *prophets*, as they are able to articulate and mobilize the necessary factors to initiate a partnership scheme. However, in the power adjustment frame, our analysis points to a different similarity across the sites, particularly on the overwhelming emphasis on profits that structured the outcomes. Power adjustment also allowed us to take a closer look at what happens after the projects are completed, and those with inherent power reasserted their power to determine outcomes.

In more classical ACP research, Krottian approaches focus on the project phases through examining dominant information, incentive/disincentives, and coercion. There have also been more recent manifestations of ACP in various contexts. For example, Prabowo et al. (2017) conducted an examination of power dynamics to investigate how various actors accumulate power to control forestland by converting it into palm oil. Their analysis focused on the periods before and after decentralization. After their application of ACP, they found a key distinction in power dynamics regarding the “power to-” to access versus the “power over-” influencing outcomes. Meanwhile, Movuh and Schusser (2012) applied ACP to assess power dynamics in the implementation of thirteen community forestry sites in Cameroon between 2009 and 2011. They focused on the role of key actors namely the continued involvement of powerful international actors (donors) as determining outcomes. Therefore, without the active involvement and budgetary support of external donors, the agreements and community forestry programs were hollow. These two contributions to ACP theory (Schusser et al., 2016),⁶ the former on the temporal elements, and the latter focused on the external actors, keep the analysis on a defined set of interventions. Our SPA formulation rather, maintains the ability to conduct the same framing for analysis in the power delivery phase, but forces the analytic to better contextualize the site-specific conditions prior to a given initiative, and beyond the implementation of the intervention.

The three phases of the SPA framework thus differ slightly from the applications of ACP research on power dynamics in two crucial ways. The first is the emphasis on the historical and contextual factors of inherent power prior to the arrival of the power delivery phase, whereas the ACP heuristic has overwhelmingly focused. Furthermore, the extension of power adjustment beyond the power delivery phase also shows the way in which a project is re-contested after the project phases subside and observers tend to look away. We show clearly in each case how our analysis of power dynamics were enhanced through the articulation of an SPA framework.

In the first case, regarding Perhutani in Java, the prophets emerged from within the institution that sought to rename and reframe their engagement with local farmer groups. The SFC therefore began to view their engagement with village institutions as partners, and therefore believed they were breaking away from the old colonial model of foremen overseeing contract workers. However, although the partnership scheme did create this discursive shift of promoting more equitable relations, the profit-sharing mechanisms remain unchanged. Even in the formal agreements to provide 25% of profits to farmer groups, ended up being further reduced by the SFC.

In the second case involving the Awota FMU, the prophets of the

partnership scheme emerged from a coalition of external actors. The regional FMU worked with the local university as part of their mandate for implementation, and promoted mutual interests with the aim of empowering local groups. However, as the project preparation phases came to a close, the local elite with existing claims to land on the sites began to reassert themselves, reclaiming their place as a central actor in the profits from the most valuable commodity: timber.

In the third case, BPDAS served as the prophets that brought the message of partnership. In this case, they held the mandate, the personnel, and the budget to implement the program. BPDAS succeeded in finding a buyer, and also helped to facilitate local farmer groups to partner with the buyer. They even mobilized funds as part of the power delivery by setting up test plots. Unfortunately, however, although BPDAS had the intent to support local farmers and connect them with a buyer, the profits never materialized and the buyer never fulfilled its part of the arrangement.

In the fourth and final example, taken from a set of cases from Bone and Pangkep, local middlemen saw the opportunities to benefit from the partnership scheme. Therefore, they acted as prophets in this case, as messengers lobbying local farmer groups promising greater access to market, engaging with different corporate actors and among the middlemen themselves, and working with the forestry agency to establish the scheme. In this example however, although some local farmers may have gotten additional access to markets, the overwhelming profits accumulated among the middlemen that originally proposed the partnership scheme.

7. Conclusion

Applying the SPA framework allowed us to see clearly across the partnership schemes in ways that forces more classical ACP analysis to stretch beyond the confines of community forestry projects. We identify two additional phases to what we describe as the power delivery phase to examining power background as the pre-conditions of analysis, and power adjustment as their ex-post outcomes. More specifically, power background helped us to highlight the key actors, their powers and interests, at each of the different sites prior to any understanding of the partnership schemes. The arrival of the delivery phase came with the messengers of the project – in this research, the four comparative cases of partnership schemes – to which we have described as the prophets. These actors brought the vision of the partnership scheme, articulated what was possible, and were able to mobilize resources by facilitating new ideas about what might be possible from the implementation of the partnership scheme. In the power adjustment phase of our framework, we extend the ACP framework to look beyond the life of the project, to examine how power constellations realign to operationalize the project after the initial framing of the initiative had passed. Each of the cases we examined in this phase were not determined by the vision of the partnership scheme, but rather were negotiated contingent upon the opportunity to gain or lose potential profits.

In sum, even in the emerging popularity of a scheme that claims to provide a more equitable benefit sharing arrangements with to local actors, we found consistently across all four cases that such outcomes are still far from realized. In the Java case of the SFC, a discursive shift might have made many believe that the arrangements had become more horizontal as a partnership, the profits showed that this was true in name only. Even in Case 3, where the benefit sharing arrangements appeared to indicate equitable transactions, the actual investments and the overall program never materialized. Overall, we have shown that in each case, what we call the prophets bring the message of partnership and deliver the programmatic scheme. However, as power is thereafter adjusted, the programmatic messengers dissipate as the outcomes shift to a determination based on profits. In this way, we have shown that the partnerships envisioned within this social forestry scheme do not automatically result in benefits for those in need of access to land or markets, but rather, serves to adjust the terms among those that already

⁶ For other relevant applications of ACP theory, see Schusser et al., (2016), Maryudi et al., (2016)

control the mechanisms to secure benefits. For the partnership scheme to achieve the desired ideals of social forestry, the restructuring or dismantling of power relations may be needed for more equitable outcomes.

As the partnership scheme continues to expand in popularity and application in Indonesia, the policy considerations of our findings are significant. Even though stated policies (the scheme of IPHPS of 2017) require implementation of 70/30 (for timber) benefit sharing schemes in the SFC or mandate equal benefit sharing mechanisms in other cases (the scheme of *Kemiraan Kehutanan* of 2014), we have shown that there are many ways to reshape outcomes by either appointing specific areas where certain stakeholders can benefit, or revaluing input costs in favor of those that get to decide.

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Prophets and profits in Indonesia's social forestry partnership schemes: Introducing a sequential power analysis

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